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Abstract  
Circassians in Israel – whose population is estimated at 4,000 people – are divided between the two villages 
of Kfar Kama (Lower Galilee, district of Tiberias) and Rihanya (Lebanese border, district of Safed). 
This population is a unique example of a non-Arab (but Caucasian) Muslim group which claims an active 
Israeli citizenship and who, contrary to such a situation might imply, retains traditional cultural elements very 
meaningful while enjoying an indisputable civic integration.  
Israelis but not Jews, Muslims but not Arabs, how Circassians of Israel could find their right place facing the 
two identitary entities competing, without leaving much space vacant, the legitimacy of a presence and whose 
stories, disasters and pains confront and compete rather than admit and understand each other? “Traitors” and 
“Muslims in the service of Zionism” for some, “second-class citizens” for others, categorizations at work 
provoke excluding mechanisms for Circassians. The concepts of nationality or religious affiliation, yet 
commonly applied in the Israeli-Palestinian space, are not efficient enough to define this “minority within the 
minority”, unable to recognize itself within any of the two dominant groups but which also seeks to distinguish 
from the “third way” embodied by Druzes.  Circassians of Israel, at the edge of all these borders, eventually built 
its own ones, although fragile, between nostalgia for a lost Caucasus and identitary reconfigurations. 
 
 
❖❖❖ 
 
 
Palestinian Jews and Israeli Arabs? 
 
In January 2008, few months before the commemorations of the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of 
the State that Israel is preparing to celebrate with pomp, the Israeli-Argentinian conductor and internationally 
well-known pianist, Daniel Baremboim, co-founder with Edward Said of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra in 
1999, was made honorary citizen in Ramallah, for his efforts to bring Israelis and Arabs closer and was given a 
Palestinian passport, becoming the first Israeli Jew to get both nationalities. 
When he said that it was a great honor for him to be granted this passport, many hostile reactions in the 
political arena and in Israeli public opinion were heard1. Yakov Margi, representating the Shas party2 in the 
Knesset asked the Israeli government to declare obsolete the Israeli citizenship of Daniel Baremboim and said 
about him: “(...) it is embarrassing for  the country that a person like him still has an Israeli citizenship (...) I am 
                                                
1 Daniel Baremboïm already had to face a call for boycott against him from the cultural commission of the Knesset for 
having made play, for the first time in Israel, an opera by Richard Wagner symbolizing for many Israelis the german 
antisemitism horror.  
2 The Shass Party (acronym for Shisha Sedarim) is a Sephardic ultra orthodox Israeli political party created in 1984. It is 
chaired by a wise men council dominated by Rabbi Ovadia Yossef, the political leader is Eli Yishaï. From a constitutional 
point of view, the Shass Party defends the idea that Israel is the State of the Jewish people and is opposed to the creation of a 
secular state. 
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sure that in the eyes of Israelis, he lost the moral authority that gave him the right to be an Israeli (...)”. In the 
readers’ letters to the editor of the newspaper Haaretz, rather left-wing, some even call the “new” Palestinian 
citizen to leave the Israeli national territory to settle in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. 
 
During the following month, in March 2008, Ghaleb Majadle, a member of the Knesset, and above all the 
first Arab Muslim to acceed to a post of minister3, triggers a political and media storm by declaring to one of the 
most important Israeli newspaper that he refuses to sing the Hatikva, the national anthem4, at the Knesset 
because he believes that it is “written for Jews only” and that “the Arabs are not in mood to sing at this time.”5 
To mark the respect he must assure, as minister of State, to the Israeli law, Ghaleb Majadle stands up when the 
national anthem sounds but refuses to sing the words that are addressed, according to him, to a separate part of 
the population and which, as a Muslim Arab citizen of Israel, he can not identify with6. 
The religious parties, the Israeli right and right wing responded immediately to cut short the revival of an old 
debate that the State of Israel has faced since its creation and, which from today, has not yet been decided: the 
disctinction between citizenship and religious practice in Israel. In other words, must Israel be the Jews’ state, 
the Jewish state or the state of all its inhabitants? 
Arieh Eldad, from the Ichud Leumi-Mafdal’s coalition declared then that an individual who refuses to sing 
the national anthem, and who does not recognize himself in it, should not be given a ministerial function. MK7 
Zevulun Orlev, from the same party, asked for public apologies for what he considers “a clear violation of the 
ministerial oath which guarantees loyalty to the State of Israel and its laws.” 
Some even ask for his resignation outright, others go further by proposing the “transfer”8 to the Palestinian 
Authority of this citizen hitherto relatively integrated into the Israeli political public sphere. 
 
A “right of being an Israeli” for Yakov Margi, a “breach (...) of loyalty to the State of Israel and its laws” for 
Zevulun Orlev: the debate remains unresolved, the boundaries are blurred and the war of words is raging. 
These two events, which seem minor under the general context, but have become a real matter of state, cited 
in remarks illustrate how issues of citizenship, ethnicity and the link between religious and politics remains 
sensitive and thorny in the Israeli-Palestinian space. 
 
Neither Jews, nor Arabs: the paradoxes of the Circassian identitary definition in the Israeli-Palestinian 
space 
 
Israelis but not Jews, Muslims but not Arabs, how Circassians of Israel could find their right place facing the 
two identitary titans competing, without leaving much space vacant, the legitimacy of a presence and whose 
stories, disasters and pains confront and compete rather than admit and understand each other? “Traitors” for 
some, “second-class citizens” for others, categorizations at work provoke excluding mechanisms for the diaspora 
in Israel. The concepts of nationality or religious affiliation, yet commonly applied in the Israeli-Palestinian 
space, are not efficient enough to define this population which, at the edge of all these borders, eventually built 
its own ones, although fragile. 
“On the one hand are the (Jews) religious who despise seculars who do not understand ultra-
Orthodox Jews ... (Jews) the Ashkenazi consider the Sephardic as less good Jews that they are because 
they have been living for a long time with Arabs, and the Sephardic say the same about Jews from 
Ethiopia ... On the other hand, there are Arabs, Muslims do not mix with Christians, there are also 
Palestinians, those in Gaza who envy those of the West Bank ... and then there are also the Bedouins ... 
how could we find our right place in this country? We have no great illusions, we must do all alone, by 
and between ourselves” 
That is what told me a resident of Rihanya during my last visit to the village9, highlights several elements in 
our thoughts. 
                                                
3 Nominated on January 10th 2007 as Minister of Culture, Sciences and Sports by the Labor Party’s leader Amir Peretz. 
4 Interview given in Yediot Aharonot on March 9th 2007.  
5 “Obviously, I won’t sing the anthem in its actual shape. But before talking about symbols, I would like to talk about equal 
chances for my children. It is more important if my son was enable to buy a house to live with dignity… Arabs are not in the 
mood for singing at the moment”.  
6 The lyrics of Hatikva are generally translated by: “As long as in the heart, within, A Jewish soul still yearns, And onward, 
towards the ends of the east, An eye still gazes toward Zion, Our hope is not yet lost, The hope of two thousands years, To be 
a free people in our land, The land of Zion and Jerusalem.” 
7 MK i.e. Knesset Member.  
8 It will be the case, in particular, of Avigdor Liberman who’s leading Ysrael Beitenou, Russian-speaking nationalist party he 
founded that can be caracterized by a very strong Policy against Arabs and especially against Palestinians. He advocates the 
“transfer” of Israeli Arabs to Palestinian Territories, and that is considered as an openly belligerant party.  
9 Interview done in Rihanya on May 2008.  
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First, that the problems of identity, borders, hierarchy and domination, are the prerogative “of others,” 
namely the Jews or the Arabs: the problems of defining identity do not apply to their community and 
discrimination has no place. Others may well tear each others, the community remains united and solidary. 
Then, the indisputable fact that the Circassian diaspora of Israel is struggling to find its place in a state where 
the borders, both physical and symbolic, are felt at all levels. An already very limited space in which boundaries 
are everywhere. Geographical boundaries first of a land on which, an obstacle, a check point, a border is quickly 
and inevitably met. Psychological delimitations then, in a geopolitical space at war where a camp must be 
chosen. These Israeli citizens, apart from two major Jewish and Arab entities, feel deeply excluded. 
 
From Caucasus to Israel: a story of the Circassian migration through the territorial reconfigurations 
 
At the end of the war between Tsarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and after more than sixty years of 
fighting between the peoples of North Caucasus and Russia, 186410 for Circassians sounds the hour of defeat and 
painful choice: agree to pay allegiance to Tsar Nicolas Ist and be evicted from their land to settle where the 
Russians would force them, or choose an exodus with no return and set far from the borders of the Russian 
Empire. 
The setting of this dispersion has persisted until now since four fifths of this displaced population still lives, 
even today, in diaspora, mainly in Russia, Turkey, Jordan and Syria11. 
Because of denominational ties that united Circassians and Turks on the one hand12, and the presence, on the 
other hand, of many Turks originally Circassians in Turkey13, they chose the path of exodus and dispersion in an 
Ottoman Empire whose borders are as unclear as excessive. 
Most of the Circassians settled in the regions which would become Turkey, Jordan and Syria, several 
thousands of them landed in Palestine, through Caesarea harbor in 1880 after spending nearly ten years at the 
Greek-Bulgarian border. 
Upon arrival, the Ottoman Sultan forced them to settle in three villages, which are called Kfar Kama, 
Rihanya and Cerkesz Kinneret. The latter, located in a swampy area, was hit by severe epidemics that forced the 
survivors to migrate to the other two villages. Circassians had, as well, to move away from big cities because 
their inhabitants refused to install these newcomers, and sent petitions to the Governor of Turkey, as it was the 
case in Nablus for example. 
The Circassian diaspora of Israel quantitatively changed very little since they are estimated to be between 
3000 and 4000 Circassians in the current Israeli territory, and it has remained spatially confined to the two 
villages where they had settled on arrival (Kfar Kama and Rihanya). Nearly one thousand Circassians from the 
Abzakh tribe live in Rihanya, in the district of Safed, i.e at the Lebanese border. It is a mixed village in which 
twenty-five percent of the total population are Arab Muslims. 
Some two thousands five hundreds Circassians from the Chapsough tribe reside in Kfar Kama in Lower 
Galilee, about ten kilometers away from the city of Afula on the road from Nazareth to Tiberias. This village is 
exclusively inhabited by Circassians but, remarkably, by an overwhelming majority of Chapsough people. 
In Israel, the spatial distribution of Circassians therefore primarily depends on the tribe they belong to and 
the expression of the tribe of origin remains the major factor of identity in the global Circassian community. This 
tribal assertion makes sense when a person defines himself : it is usual to add the name of the tribe of origin to 
the family name. In case of a marriage between two Circassians from different tribes, the tribal affiliation of the 
father will be used to identify an individual. 
Insisting on the tribal membership and distribution in this numerically very small diaspora is necessary not 
only to understand the mechanisms of its identity but also to shed light on the different forms of representations 
of the group both within the sphere of ethnicity and outside the space community, both in Israeli and Arabic 
societies. 
 
When the Druzes and the Circassians are perceived as a homogeneous whole and clearly seperate from 
the Arabs 
 
Today the State of Israel recognizes the existence of three nationalities (leom): Jewish, Arab and Druze. 
Druzes and Circassians are the two non-Jewish communities involved in the process of national defense14, 
they are usually presented together, in official speeches as well as in the public opinion. 
                                                
10 The first clashes between Russians and Caucasians are dated around 1785 (under the authority of Cheikh Chamil) and that 
the last battle was led by an Oubykh group in 1864.  
11 Respectively two million, one million, 60,000 and 30,000.  
12 The expansion of Islam in Nothern Caucasus during the XIXth century gave the Sultan a Religious legitimacy as 
“Believers’ Leader”. 
13 Due to the proslavery behaviors, a lot of Sultans’ wives and mothers were Circassian, and a lot of Circassian boys were 
sold for their warrior qualities during more than a century. 
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Under the cover of unwavering “loyalty” to the State, which is an idea mainly fed by the compulsory 
participation of men from both communities to the national army but, above all, by the distance consciously kept 
with the Palestinian cause and through the prism of an active claim of the Israeli citizenship, Druzes and 
Circassians are given a special treatment which is very different from the one reserved to the Arabic populations 
of the country, both in the political management of the villages and in the recognition of their cultural and 
religious specificites. 
The Knesset, for example, has adopted a specific budget for the development of the substructures of these 
two communities, and some four hundred forty seven million shekels have been allocated to the different 
municipalities concerned from 2006 to 2009. In comparison, a budget from thirteen to fourteen million shekels 
has been voted for the development of thirty-four non-Jewish communities in the north of the country in the year 
2007. 
From a symbolic point of view, the special treatment given to these populations by the State of Israel also 
goes through the importance Israeli politicians grant the cultural days or various festivals organized by the 
villages. The visible and claimed presence of Israeli officials at the slightest folk festival transforms each 
occasion into a theater of thanks and cleverly organized performances providing a striking lightning on the 
relationship between the community leaders and the State of Israel. 
It is also interesting to note that out of the sixty two official lobbies of the seventeenth Knesset (2006), one 
specifically concerns the defense of the Circassian and Druze interests, presented once more, as a coherent whole 
with similar interests. This lobby, chaired by the Druze Majalli Whbee, is composed of twenty-five members of 
the whole Israeli political spectrum, including two members of the Ysrael Beitenou party, the leader of which is 
Avigdor Liberman, who called in May 2006, for the execution of the Israeli Arab representatives who had either 
been in contact with Hamas or had celebrated the Naqba (the “catastrophe” commemorating the expulsion of 
Palestinians) instead of commemorating Yom Ha'atsmaout (celebrations of Israel’s independence). The 
investment in that lobby of two members of a party advocating openly racist theories is particularly symptomatic 
of the very clear distinction made in Israel between Druzes and Circassians, perceived as an homogenous whole, 
and Arabs. 
But if Druzes represent 9 % of the overall Israeli population15, estimated around 120,000 individuals, and if 
they have an effective representation on the political scene by members of Parliament and even a minister16,  the 
case is significantly different for Circassians since they represent a very small community of 3,500 people spread 
over two villages and since they have no other representation than political leaders of their villages. There are no 
Circassian members of Parliament nor ministers: their political representation is exclusively local and not 
national. (This will play, among other things, an important part in the Israeli popular ignorance about 
Circassians.) 
Kfar Kama officially received the designation of “Local Council” in 195017 because the village is inhabited 
by more than 2,000 people. Rihanya is numerically too small to obtain its own Local Council18, the village is 
included with eight community villages19 (Yishouv Kehilat), one kibbutz20, thirteen moshavim21 and one Druze 
village22, under the auspices of the Regional Council of Merom Ha Galil. Each one headed by a local committee 
which sends a number of representatives proportionally to the size of its population to the Regional Council. 
The Circassians are therefore for the State of Israel, neither a major stake nor an electoral force to attract. 
Accordingly, Circassians, because they keep on being constantly classed as Druze, have no official recognition 
of their specific character. 
The immediate consequence of this lack of recognition as a specific group with a culture and religious 
practice apart from the Druzes’ones is translated into a relative unfamiliarity of the Jewish Israeli public. The 
Israelis, when they know the very term “Circassians,” often after having met one of them during their military 
service, assimilate  them – once again – to Druzes and consider them as a cult with its own lifestyle and a culture 
                                                                                                                                                   
14 Men from the two communities are to do the compulsory militarian service, this requirement is not asked to any other 
Muslim of the Israeli-Palestinian space. It was a request from the villages’ leaders (as soon as 1948 for the Circassians). 
15 The Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, Israel, 2007.  
16 Majalli Whbee was elected Representative at the 16th Knesset in 2003 for the Likoud. In March 2005, he has been 
nominated VP of PM Ariel Sharon’s personal staff, and therefore became Vice-Minister in charge of Education, Culture and 
Sports in June 2006. When Ariel Sharon leaves the Likoud, he co-founds with him Kadima and is elected Representative at 
the 17th Knesset in 2006. He becomes VP of the Knesset. In October 2007, he joins Ehud Olmert’s personal staff as Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
17 Kfar Kama is the first non-Jewish locality that has been recognized as “Local Council” by the State of Israel. In 2003, there 
were 144 Local Councils in Israel.  
18 Around 1000 inhabitants nowadays.  
19 Amuka, Bar Yochai, Birya, Inbar, Kalanit, Kfar Hananya, Livnim and Or HaGanuz. 
20 Parod. 
21 Alma, Amirim, Avivim, Dalton, Dovev, Hazon, Kerem Ben Zimra, Kfar Hoshen, Kfar Shamai, Meron, Shefer, Shezor and 
Tefahot.  
22 Ein el-Asad. 
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aside. An unknown world which feeds numerous fantasies, in a questionnaire distributed to about fifty Israeli 
Jews in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa, to the question “to which religion do the Circassians belong to?”, some, 
without the slightest hesitation, replied “Circassian”. Thus, it’s as if these “brave” Circassians involved in the 
war effort and in the state’s defense, as if this so “fair” minority in opposition to the figure of the Israeli Arab 
potentially seen as “dangerous” for the State of Israel23, could not share anything, even a religion, with the 
enemy. The Circassians of Israel have made their own the Israeli representations, widely insisting on their 
difference with Israeli Arabs, refraining from publicly expressing support to the Palestinian cause. They have 
built their identity through the mirror of the Israeli society. 
 
An identity built in a double distinction to otherness 
 
The privileges granted by the state to these two populations, continue to feed a ditch from which is ensued a 
double effect. 
This loyalty is considered as an act of betrayal by the Arabs of the country for whom Circassians are traitors 
to the Umma24, and are therefore excluded from the community of believers, however, supposed to transcend 
nationalities and governments. 
The inclusion in the Israeli socio-political space where the non-written constitution urges citizens to define 
themselves by faith, and in response to other Muslims in front of whom it was urgent to legitimize its religious 
identity, led Circassians of Israel to adopt a net shift in their own conception of their identity. From now on, this 
latter is mainly built around a traditionalist and a rigorous practice of Islam, quite different from the practices 
that can be observed in the other diasporas in the Middle-East. 
In their daily practices in the North Caucasus25, the area where they are initially from, if Circassians observe 
the main Muslim celebrations, as the Ramadan fast, very few of them practice the five daily prayers and few 
young women are veiled. 
In most cities in this region, there are only very few mosques, for example, the city of Maikop, however 
capital of the Adygha Republic, has only one mosque, built very recently in 2001. 
Traditionally, it is the “Adygha Khabza”, a code of honor orally transmitted, which controled the conduct of 
Circassians and regulated social norms. This code of conduct revolves around respect for the elder, seen as a 
guide that instructs the youngest, around gender equality, sharing and mutual help, and around the art of 
dominating yourself and behaving in society. In any case, religion originally regulates the conduct of 
Circassians. 
Unlike other diasporas established in the rest of the Middle East26, Islam is the heart of the identitary 
definition of the Circassians of Israel. This particularly thrust and ostentatious religious practice can be 
explained by two main elements. The first is, undoubtedly, the inclusion of the diaspora in the socio-political 
Israeli-Palestinian space strengthened by the affirmation of the religious nature of the conflict largely defended 
by the war propaganda both Israeli and Palestinian and the assertion of a predominance of two major religions. 
These religious practices can not be seperated from the context of reislamisation that began in Israel in the 
seventies and which conducted the concerned populations to mark more clearly their religious belongig as an 
identitary vector. The second factor is the classic pattern of identitary construction in front of otherness. The 
originality of the Circassian diaspora of Israel is that this construction is built in a double distinction to the 
Other: the Other of the country of course, whether Jewish or Arab, but especially the Other Cirassians in the 
Middle-East in front of whom must be legitimized  its presence on a territory oftenly considered hostile or as an 
enemy by its neighbors. Indeed, in 1948, when the State of Israel was created, Circassians of Palestine did not 
migrate to neighboring Syria or Jordan as one might have expected. They made the choice to stay within the 
borders of the new state and embrace full Israeli citizenship by paying allegiance to the country. The assertion of 
that acute religious practice was chosen by them as a proof of their good “Circassian-ness”. Thus, for 
Circassians in Israel, it seems like they have to be more Circassians than other Circassians and more Muslims 
                                                
23 The use of the terms in quotes is taken from different interlocutors I met or has been taken from questionaires distributed, 
and would not –in any case- reveal my own opinion or judgment on these different populations and could not qualify the 
opinion of the whole Israeli population.  
24 Druzes – whom secret doctrine, is based, among others things, on the belief of the metempsychosis, and the incorporation 
of elements from Islam or from Greek philosophy – reject the charia and the obligations associated. They are considered as 
heretics, by the majority of Muslims either Sunni or Shiite. Druzes believed they are the only ones to profess rigorously the 
tawhid (that is to say the divine unit) and considered themselves muwahiddun (the unitarians). They don’t face the same 
critics than Circassians considered as traditional Sunni Muslims.  
25 Generical term used here to point out the three Nothern-Caucasian Republics where they are spread, that is to say : the 
Adygha Republic, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Karatchaevo-Tcherkessian Republic.  
26 As, for instance, in Jordan and in Syria. In their great majority, Circassians from these two countries will define themselves 
as Circassians first before considering themselves as Muslims.  
 6 
than other Muslims. Therefore, being a good Circassian in Israel is being a good Muslim, and being a good 
Muslim guarantees the fact of being a good Circassian. 
The Circassians of Israel claim to be the guarantors of the Caucasian traditions, including by respecting this 
religious practice. But initially Circassians believed in a large pantheon of divinities, mainly representing the 
forces of nature and agriculture, such as “Hana Gush” the god of rain, “Shagbala” the one of thunder, “Pshtzia” 
the one of lightning, “Miztaha” the one of forests, “Tlafsh” the one of iron as well as “Wazramas” the one of 
beauty. They were converted to Christianity, like all the peoples of Caucasus, in the sixth century27, and to Islam 
in the late eighteenth century. This construction will be then internalized: thus was born a “new tradition”.  
 
Identitary import-export: building a bridge between the society of origin and the one of destination 
 
That is in reference to a land of origin made sacred, reinforced by the traumatic figure of the forced exodus 
that Circassians of Israel have built their identitary definition. References to the “motherland” are predominant 
in the speeches inside the community itself and outside. Trades between villages and the Caucasus (especially 
with Adygha Republic) are becoming more and more frequent since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 1991, 
Kfar Kama sent a delegation to visit the new republic, barely emancipated from the Soviet Union but which 
obtained a status of “autonomous republic linked to the Russian Federation”. Students go on “pilgrimages” on 
the land of their ancestors, villages receive official delegations from Maikop to inaugurate museums and to 
attend various celebrations. Circassian musicians from Caucasus are invited to perform during the annual 
festivals of Kfar Kama and Rihanya and are warmly welcomed, cheered and erected to the level of real 
international stars. Exchange platforms and community meeting websites flourish on the web and Caucasus is 
the popular destination for honeymoons, wedding anniversaries or can be a perfect gift to celebrate the 
graduation of a child of the family. 
Owning an object from the Caucasus makes the head of family proud: it can be a figurine representing a 
jumper or a dancer, an accordion engraved on a piece of wood, an imitation of an ancient saber, a clock painted 
in the colors of the Circassian green flag with its twelve stars representing the twelve tribes and three arrows for 
the three North Caucasus republics where Circassians come from, or even a small photography or a postcard of 
the Caucasus’ mountains. Bought during a travel by the family itself or by a relative or friend, these very popular 
gifts are specifically highlighted and find their place in the reception room with the greatest exposure in terms of 
visitors. Some people even create small personnal museums, in a cellar or in a room specially designed for the 
occasion, competing with the others for the newest item, “hunting” for rarities, comparing the objects in their 
possession, accumulating clippings and photographs: the construction of the collective memory takes the pattern 
of a competition between material memories. 
If these objects are only stereotyped markers of a culture in representation, a mother particularly proud to 
own a painting of a couple in traditional clothes standing in front of a mountain confided: “It is as if there were a 
piece of Caucasus at home”. To import from Caucasus such an object in Israel enables its possessor to establish 
a symbolic bridge between “its” two lands, the origins’ one and the welcoming one. 
References to the Caucasus are also prevalent in the self-presentation of the community in the Israeli society. 
The two villages slowly opened themselves to tourism, a “folk” tourism attracting a mainly Jewish Israeli 
audience living around. Conferences are organized by a retired teacher from the village, recounting a general 
history of Circassians, presenting Caucasus with maps and photographs. He also tells the story of dispersion 
which has a strong resonance among the Jewish public, the story of the settling in the Middle-East and 
Circassians’ integration in the Israeli society, described as totally successful. A particular emphasis is made on 
the loyalty of the community and the voluntary participation in compulsory service. 
Insisting so much on references to Caucasus, as the land of origins and as the “homeland” forever 
unforgettable, also has a positive resonance among Jewish tourists: the Circassians do not claim their territory, 
nor a historical Palestine, their land is elsewhere and is particularly faraway. 
The neighbor becomes tourist who becomes host and will be guided through the village by a local scholar, he 
will visit the museum where maps of the Caucasus and exile are translated into hebrew, restored houses in a 
“traditional” style, the Circassian restaurant in which he will be able to discover and buy Circassian food, or 
perceived as such, that he will be able to take home. It’s his turn to export what one considers as a “piece of the 
Circassian village” in the Israeli society. 
However, these geographical references rarely exceed the discursive framework, while some of Israeli 
Circassians develop professional partnerships with the Caucasus, some are even regularly back but this practice 
is still very scarce. A bunch of them left Israel and settled in Caucasus, and even if the speech of returning back 
home remains associated with the life-project (usually not for himself but for future generations), there is no 
collective project to return there for the whole diaspora. When this happens, it is only the result of individual 
                                                
27 Islam is the main religion in Northern-Caucasus, but it’s lonly in the early XVIIIth century that the majority of Circassian 
Princes converted to Islam dragging their subjects.  
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paths: the majority of the Israeli Circassians say they do not want to leave the village they consider as the place 
of the highest expression of their “Circassian-ness”. 
 
Living between oneself or how to get out of the geo political context symbolically  
 
In view of a lack of recognition of their particularity and against their position of Muslims “in the service of 
the State of Israel”, the Circassians are, step by step,  getting symbolically out of geo-political context. This 
“minority within the minority”, unable to recognize itself within any of the two dominant groups but which also 
seeks to distinguish from the “third way” embodied by Druzes, eventually began to stage its own identitary 
construction. To this end, Circassians built, like the entire Israeli society, their own spatio-temporal borders. 
Spatial borders first, marking the effective and physical demarcation of the village. The village becomes the 
Circassian “territory”, regarded even by some villagers as an ideal  “embryo of Nation-State”, a symbol of a 
reassuring and protector place. The village represents the guarantee of a total expression of the Circassian 
identity they rebuilt inside this space, and whose legitimacy is not questioned by any external review. 
In Israel, being a Circassian is above all being a Circassian in the village: “I was born in the village, I grew 
up in the village, I got married in the village, I raised my children in the village, I work in village and I will die 
in the village (...) the village is my home” often say interlocutors when asked about the importance of living in 
the village or coming back there after studying in Haifa, Jerusalem or Beer Sheva. The village, cut off from the 
world, is seen as a bulwark against the environment and the danger of assimilation, the main fear of this tiny 
community. 
The boundaries of the village mark the material separation with the Jewish neighboring for Kfar Kama and 
the Arab’s one for Rihanya. “Here, I feel like a member of the clan, unlike in Nazareth where I grew up (...) 
there I never felt at home ... because we were not between us ... we were with the Arabs” said one of the few 
residents of Kfar Kama that has been raised outside the village and who felt the need to come back while her 
first child was born28. 
The village allows Circassians to assert their so desired specificity, the one that the State of Israel is so slow 
to recognize and formalize. 
The autarkic working has eventually been internalized as a sine qua non condition of cultural survival: “Here 
we are between us, with the same education, we are all Circassians, we speak our language, we are all good 
Muslims (...) We are an Islamic29 village, everyone understands everyone, we’re not judged by anyone ... We 
can keep our traditions and live as in Caucasus” said another villager. 
 
“Here we’re not judged by anyone”, “living as in Caucasus”, the terminology used is unequivocal: the 
reference to the land of origin and its memory is still alive and Circassians are tired of not finding their place in 
the Israeli-Palestinian society, injured to be regarded as traitors to a cause which is not historically theirs, 
offended to be considered as second class citizens in a place they inhabit yet since 1880, a country they have 
seen the birth and have helped to build and protect. 
Then the Circassians have stopped living in the Israeli-Palestinian space, now they contented themselves 
with living in the village. 
An invisible minority in the minority, building an identity that only matches its particular situation, refering 
to the mythology of an heroic people of warriors, brave, loyal, proud and upright, as if it was the way to 
counterbalance the judgment of their “brothers” who reject them, and constantly try to revive an one hundred 
fifty years dreamt Caucasus that no longer exists than elsewhere beside handed down memories. A Caucasus 
which remains above all, the last remainders of a valued time, the one before the disaster, before exile and 
dispersion. 
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